Abstract: This paper examines the feasibility and economic benefits of stock exchanges alliances among OIC countries. Despite common Islamic culture, OIC local capital market conditions are heterogeneous depending on legal jurisdictions, income level and the maturity of stock market development. Therefore, in this paper, we suggest a set of internationally acceptable standards that aim to provide guidance for the development and implementation of policy irrespective of local differences so that they can form the basis for the development of sound stock exchanges in OIC countries. For the future development of OIC stock exchanges, we propose a bifurcated or two-tier system for blue-chips and small / medium-sized firms. That is, although small and locally operating firms will list shares at local exchanges, larger firms will rely on regional financial centers within Asian, Europe and MENA regions in the long term or a pan-OIC exchange irrespective of where this market will be located in OIC countries.
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Introduction
Around the world, stock markets have been undergoing rapid changes in developed and developing countries over the past two decades. Tremendous competition has arisen among major stock exchanges to attract listings and trading volume. They have become increasingly global, with large increases in cross-border capital flows.
Listing, trading, and new issuance are concentrating in fewer stock exchanges. With few exceptions, OIC countries have not participated in global consolidation waves and are still pursuing a 'made at home' strategy in developing their own stock 2 The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an inter-governmental organization grouping 57 mostly Islamic nations in the Middle East, North and West Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and South America. Visit main OIC website (http://www.oic-oci.org/) to learn more about the role, the organizational chart, and OIC member countries. 3 The Islamic Development Bank (IDB, http://www.isdb.org/) has fostered the promotion of economic development and cooperation among its member countries as a primary objective in accordance with the principles of Shari'ah i.e., Islamic Law since its inception in 1976. The prospective member country should be a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC).
exchanges. Furthermore, the strong home market preference found for many developed countries demonstrates how difficult it is to generate foreign trading volume within OIC stock markets since most OIC stock markets are small and illiquid even relative to most emerging markets -let alone compared to developed markets. Therefore, Claessens et al. (2000) point out that many of these 'import substitution' approaches in developing stock markets are doomed to fail. Recently, Claessens et al. (2003) suggest the following three survival options -self-survival strategy, linkages, and mergers -for stock exchanges in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), which also provide useful strategic implications with OIC countries.
Self-survival strategy seeks to prosper by themselves by reducing costs and increasing revenues of their own exchanges.
Linkages try to establish some form of cross-border linkages with other exchanges to achieve cost savings from many different sources (economy of scale, sharing system for equity trading, and harmonizing rules and requirements between the exchanges with respect to trading and membership).
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) merge with, or are taken over by, one or more other exchanges. Mergers hold clear advantages over any linkage due to the irrelevancy of gain distribution, higher credibility, solid and sound cooperation.
Two well-known examples of mega-mergers among cross-border exchanges are NOREX 4 and NYSE Euronext. 4 The NOREX implements a common system for share trading and harmonizes the trading and membership rules and regulations for exchanges in different countries. listing and other rules, up to the standards of the international financial markets. In some OIC countries, enforcement of securities market regulation will also need to be strengthened. However, in the long term, we expect that OIC stock markets progress toward a more unified capital market or several regional financial centers by creating the cross-border merging of stock exchanges along with the consolidation of clearing and settlement systems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature on the economic effects of globalization among major stock exchanges together with benefits 6 The 'home country bias' in portfolio selection refers to the tendency of investors to predominantly hold locally-listed securities, thereby foregoing opportunities to diversify their portfolios by holding foreign assets.
7 Although many national airlines perennially lose money, each country tends to have a national airline.
Similarly, each country also has a strong desire to have its own regulation of a national stock exchange.
and challenges facing stock exchanges alliances. We examine current OIC capital market conditions in Section 3 and suggest feasible policy guidelines in Section 4. Section 5 provides conclusions.
Literature review on the globalization and stock exchanges alliances
The mixed economic effects of globalization efforts in stock exchanges
The empirical evidence of economic effects on the internationalization of stock markets varies considerably among individual countries and has been in a longstanding disagreement among academicians and policy makers. For example, Levine and Schmukler (2006) argue that when a firm cross-lists or issues depositary receipts 8 (DRs) in an international stock exchange (e.g., the NYSE or LSE), the trading of the firm's shares tends to migrate out of the domestic market and into the more advanced international market, which hurts the liquidity of domestic firms. Therefore, the concern among policy makers in emerging stock markets is that internationalization has a negative impact on domestic stock market liquidity and trading volumes, impeding stock market development and potentially lowering future economic growth (King and Levine, 1993; Khan and Senhadji, 2000) . On the other hand, the empirical evidence does not support the fear that foreign investment liberalization will impede domestic stock market development (For a survey of empirical literature, see Karolyi, 1998) . For example, the cross-listings and using depositary receipts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) exchanges on international stock exchanges added credibility to the privatization process, and in that way had positive feedback on the incipient local CEEC stock markets (FEAS, 2001 ). In addition, the lack of information, capital controls, legal restrictions, discriminatory taxation, and liquidity in emerging stock markets are important barriers to investing in these markets.
Therefore, in many developing countries, obstacles often prevent foreign investors from entering the local market. A company can overcome this challenge by cross-listing or issuing a depositary receipt and still encourage investment from abroad without having to worry about barriers to entry that a foreign investor might face.
To better interpret the mixed economic effects on globalization experience across individual countries, Hargis and Ramanlal (1998) develop a theoretical model to examine the impact of international cross-listing on domestic market liquidity and trading volume.
Contrary to fears of policy makers in emerging markets, they find that cross-listing on larger more transparent markets, from smaller less liquid markets with greater foreign ownership restrictions, show the greatest enhancement in domestic stock market development because the potential to increase shareholder base is also an important factor for stock market development. More recently, Lau and Mclnish (2002) also find that cross-listing thus far has resulted in a "win-win" situation with volume and liquidity improving in the domestic market even though the foreign market dominates trading.
Potential benefits and challenges facing cross-border stock exchanges alliances
The integration of stock exchanges produces a number of significant efficiency gains by eliminating the duplication of costly infrastructure, thus reducing the average cost of producing a trade (Cybo-Ottone et al., 2000; Steil, 2001; McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2002; Goldberg et al., 2002; Claessens et al., 2002; Ramos, 2003) . For example, accessing a single trading platform instead of two (or more) allows market professionals to save on the hardware, software and skilled human capital necessary to access and monitor separate trading platforms. Integration also allows investors to trade more diversified portfolios, in some cases overcoming the fact that they were previously unaware of the existence of some securities. In addition, integration of national exchanges and the ensuing increase in cross-border trading increases liquidity, as reflected by lower bid-ask spreads, greater trading volumes, and lower volatility.
For example, the creation of a single trading platform made it possible for Euronext N.V. to reduce its operation costs and eliminate the duplication of infrastructure and IT investments across the individual exchanges in Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon and Paris. Studies also show that as a consequence of full integration of stock markets, the cost of equity capital for the companies attracting capital through stock exchanges as well as the cost of settling securities transactions will decline by an average of 50 basis points.
The European economy may, in turn, grow at an annual rate of 1.1%, thanks to more efficient financing of the economy (London Economics, 2002).
For theoretical work, Di Noia (2001) uses the economic theory of network externalities and a simple-game theoretical framework to explore the issue of competition among stock exchanges and the possibility of consolidation in the European stockexchange industry. Di Noia strongly argues that a merger is a clear strategic option for exchanges because it improves welfare, consumer surplus, and total profits as well. This paper also suggests that regulation should guide or favor a merger, eliminating all obstacles to listing and delisting in exchanges and to trading, implementing, in full, remote access; public and exchange regulators should avoid discrimination among national firms and intermediaries and foreign ones. This paper further shows the existence of equilibria where exchanges may decide to achieve full compatibility through implicit mergers 9 and remote access, specializing only in trading or listing services.
However, in reality, of the many attempts at cross-border cooperation between exchanges that have been proposed, few have been implemented, and of those that have capital raising opportunities for the listed local companies, these improvements occurred gradually only for the largest companies. So, the Baltic stock exchanges generated trading fees that could not justify acquisition of the required new and expensive trading system SAXESS. These factors together created little incentives for both parties to proceed with the merger and bear the integration costs that were unlikely to provide fast enough payoff. Therefore, we learn, from the experience of Euronext N.V. and NOREX mergers, that cost efficiencies created by consolidation of a trading platform should be sizeable, timely, merger-specific, and passed on to users.
The closer look of OIC stock exchanges
The characteristics of OIC stock exchanges
We categorize In Table 1 regulatory frameworks which are yet to be developed and the macroeconomic risks the investors assign to those markets. Among the other causes that explain the shallowness of those markets, the following points could also be mentioned: lack of adequate flow of financial information, lack of product differentiation (scale of economies, differentiation of services), existence of cross-country legal and regulatory differences (differences of listing requirements, accounting diversity), high information costs, cultural and linguistic differences and geographic diversity (SESRTCIC, 2005 and . Table 2 .
Major problems in OIC stock markets
Any sound capital market should be fair, efficient, and transparent as prerequisites so that investors are assured that the rules of the game are fair, equitably applied and effectively enforced. However, the development of equity markets in many OIC countries is being hampered by lack of investor protection and transparent securities trading. In addition to the problem of inadequate or non-existent rules and regulations, there are also serious enforcement problems. Many OIC countries lack an effective system for enforcing laws, regulations, and self-regulatory organization (SRO) rules governing the operation of equity markets. Other obstacles faced by policy makers in OIC countries include 1) low quality or inconsistent accounting standards, 2) poor or non-existent corporate governance standards, 3) lack of investor compensation schemes, 4) insufficient knowledge of basic capital market rules and practices among investors, 5) a weak bankruptcy system, 6) the absence of large and active domestic institutional investors, 7) inadequate clearing and settlement systems, 8) grey areas of legislation due to inconsistencies in the legal and regulatory framework, 9) lack of competition in domestic financial markets. Clearly, this list is not exhaustive, but it highlights the principal problems encountered in trying to develop strong capital markets in OIC countries.
More recently, the development of access via Internet routing is permitting investors to trade through web-sites, in some cases directly with each other, bypassing traditional exchanges. Financial policy makers around the globe have recognized that the implementation of internationally acceptable standards and best practices is essential for the successful integration of OIC countries into the world financial systems. Policy makers from emerging markets increasingly appreciate the importance of strong domestic capital markets for economic growth and higher living standards (King and Levine, 1993; Khan and Senhadji, 2000) .
Policy implications and strategic decisions for OIC exchanges survival
Policy agenda for the development of OIC stock exchanges
In general, OIC capital market integration is expected to go through the following phases: a) Foreign investment inflow, b) Further development and strengthening of local market participants, c) Active cross-border investing and investment opportunities. Then, we may think of setting up cross-border exchanges alliances within Asian, Europe and MENA regions in the long term based on the results of cointegration tests. The reason is that most OIC stock markets are currently fragmented, as evidenced by weak cointegrating relationships and substantially low correlations. We also believe that regional cross-border integrations (mergers), such as NOREX and Euronext, among high and middle income OIC groups within Asia, Europe, and MENA regions should be more recommended rather than loose forms of cooperation (linkages) such as associations, federations, unions, or joint ventures.
We suggest the following policy agenda for the development of OIC stock
exchanges. An adequate legal framework for the effective regulation and functioning of exchanges should be enforced to protect investors and to operate fair, efficient and transparent stock markets by taking into account international standards. In addition, some of OIC countries have sought to ensure that only one major exchange is in operation for the need to establish one big and liquid domestic market, or to restrict the trading of shares in companies that are listed on another exchange. However, it is unlikely that these policies will be successful in the long term in shielding a market from diversification and competition. Ultimately, both firms and investors will benefit from increased competition within and between OIC stock markets. (Steil, 2001; Lee, 2002) . It may allow an exchange 1) to modernize its technology; 2) to obtain a governance and management structure that is more agile, flexible, and swift in its ability to respond to industry and market conditions; 3) to avoid concentration of ownership power in a particular group of exchange participants; 4) to create a catalyst for pursuing new business strategies; 5) to improve financial decision-making by ensuring that resources are allocated to business initiatives and ventures that enhance shareholder value. The demutualized exchanges, however, will require significantly more regulation than mutual exchanges not because of the difficulties of self-regulation, but rather due to likely anti-competitive behavior.
heart of the effective development of stock exchanges in any developing market such as OIC stock exchanges. Although these issues already figure high on the agenda of policy makers from the more advanced markets, they are becoming increasingly important to those from OIC countries and other emerging markets as well.
Despite the progress of financial markets integration, the OIC stock markets are still governed by different legal systems, and other major obstacles -legal, regulatory, tax or technical -to cross-border activity within the OIC countries. Moreover, protectionist pressures are still at work. Therefore, to achieve a major integration of OIC stock markets it will be necessary to ensure equal access to market infrastructure, such as trading platforms, clearing and settlement systems, and to remove unfair tax measures which represent discrimination against cross-border suppliers. Harmonization of rules essential for investor protection is also important for both supply-and demand-side reasons. The key factor in the securities market integration process is the integration of market infrastructures, i.e., integration of securities trading, clearing and settlement systems. Full integration of financial sector infrastructures means that trading and settlement costs related to transactions are the same for the investor, regardless of the place of issue of the security. This means that the same rules apply to all market players, they have equal access to the market, and they are treated equally there.
Therefore, it appears that a merger between exchanges can directly benefit their users and final investors in several ways. First, a merger broadens both broker and investor's trading opportunities by offering them direct access to several markets at a lower cost. This reduces 'home bias' effects by facilitating cross-border trading and allowing investors to hold more diversified portfolios. Second, it may benefit final investors by lowering their implicit trading costs through the provision of greater liquidity as reflected by lower bid-ask spreads and higher trading volume. The greater liquidity may also be associated with lower volatility of stock prices. The past experience tells us that competition led some exchanges to a) sign strategic alliances which eventually failed (e.g., Euroquote and Eurolist; London Stock Exchange (LSE)-Deutsche Borse (DB) alliance (1998); the Euro-8 alliance (2000); iX among LSE, DB and Nasdaq; the EuroNM circuit), b) to merge (e.g., DTB-SOFFEX into EUREX; Helsinki Stock Exchange-Finnish Options market (SOM); the Vienna Stock 13 Politics is a key factor in determining whether, and how, securities exchanges consolidate in the future. Although OIC stock exchanges have pursued several loose forms of strategic alliances (linkages) among OIC stock exchanges or with developed stock exchanges (see SESRTCIC, 2005 SESRTCIC, & 2006 , it seems to be very difficult to achieve the cost savings if each participating exchange uses a different market model because of the duplications in software development. In addition, linkages may give raise to various coordination and hold-up problems. A linkage requires that the participants enter into contracts that specify, for example, how the costs of any investments to upgrade the platform would be shared. Each participant, however, has an incentive to minimize its own contribution to development costs and free-ride on the investments made by others. This is likely to lead to under-investment in the absence of a clear ex-ante commitment on how such costs will be shared.
However, creating a fully-specified contract that covers all possible contingencies will be also very challenging. This will continue to be the case because of a problem that is unavoidable in linkages, as opposed to mergers, between securities exchanges, namely the difficulty of creating credible contractual commitments between cooperation partners.
An alliance is unlikely to achieve the same level of staff-cost savings as a merger, for example, because each exchange will be likely to retain its own corporate and head-office functions.
Future blueprint of OIC stock exchanges
The absolute majority of OIC stock exchanges can be characterized by a typical low liquidity and also by a small number of primary issues. The unified platform should allure more investors. The future in the functioning of OIC stock markets is envisaged as an affiliated branch of another foreign exchange. In this way it would enable the successful local companies to carry on business with their shares also in lucrative foreign markets and would lead to the improvement of advertising and to a greater interest in the OIC capital markets and in the investment in OIC companies within the sphere of foreign investors.
It is clear that the current worldwide trend is to carry on business outside borders.
However, there is a question whether the OIC capital markets are interesting for foreign investors and what it can offer to them. From the viewpoint of future revenues, the OIC capital markets are certainly interesting because it is undeveloped and has a great potential of growth. In comparison with the situation abroad it will certainly offer its investors much higher capital revenues in the near future in comparison with advanced and stable capital markets.
We expect OIC capital markets to be more closely integrated with other exchanges. All developed stock markets go ahead in this sense at a rapid pace. Various global exchanges are being developed as, for instance, Euronext and NOREX, with which national exchanges are integrated at a local level, and surely OIC countries, like other countries, will not avoid this development in the future. Another possibility is the mutual integration of all OIC exchanges suffering from a scarcity of liquidity and little or no primary issue offers in the market. As a consequence, an effectively functioning liquidity market or regional financial centers within Asia, Europe and MENA regions could be established. In the future, it is likely that among individual OIC markets there will be no obstacles preventing investors and issuers to pass from one exchange to
another. As such, the future does not need to be seen only in the unified big exchange 14 but also in a large number of smaller exchanges, which will be competing with one another (Baran, 2004) .
In sum, we should not forget that national sentiments and institutions may prevent the concentration process. National bourses, just like national airlines, have a strong symbolic value and therefore do not disappear easily. We expect that a two-tier market will develop. On the one hand, there are shares issued by small and mediumsized companies which will be issued and traded at a local or regional level, while shares of larger companies, the so-called blue chips, will increasingly be issued at a pan-OIC level and traded on an OIC-wide basis as well. Apart from these two segments, there is a truly global segment for shares of, for example, multinational companies whose shares are listed in large finance centers like New York, London, and Tokyo. The ultimate 14 The location of an exchange still remains a vital political symbol for the success of a financial center.
However, trading systems can be both located and registered in jurisdictions that are different from the locations in which most of the market participants using the trading systems are located due to remote access.
outcome of the integration process of OIC stock exchanges, a truly unified stock market, could be reached via a system of common access, followed by market convergence, then joint markets and finally one operational market 15 in the long term.
Conclusions
The future development of OIC stock markets will depend on the degree of macroeconomic stability, the strength of legal systems, and the quality of information in each country. Therefore, OIC stock exchanges should improve the basic infrastructure for the financial sector, including stronger legal rights for creditors and share holders, better information, greater disclosure, well-governed institutional investors, and supporting public and private institutions. So far, the European Union (EU) has involved the creation of a borderless capital market among its members which are of different sizes, regulatory philosophies, and market cultures with centralized regulatory policymaking and decentralized enforcement. In this regards, the past experience from the EU can provide OIC policy makers with a role model to development of OIC stock exchanges.
Through a more open and integrated OIC capital market, a number of benefits are expected for both investors and the corporate sector to share risk and allocate capital effectively. Investors will benefit from higher risk-adjusted returns on savings, through enhanced opportunities for portfolio diversification and more liquid and competitive 15 Lee (2002) explains the evolution of European exchanges as follows. At the most simplistic level, the structure of the exchange in Europe started off as a monopoly (with a single municipal exchange), swung to a more competitive environment (with competing municipal exchanges in the same country), returned to a monopoly (with a single consolidated national exchange), became more competitive (with competing national exchanges and other types of trading systems), and is now becoming more consolidated and monopolistic again (with potentially just one or a few European exchanges). This evolution process should provide OIC policy makers with useful implications to the future development of OIC stock exchanges.
capital markets. The corporate sector will benefit from generally easier access to financing capital because competition in the financial intermediation sector will offer corporations a wider range of financial products at attractive prices (London Economics, 2002) . These conditions will, in turn, contribute to guaranteeing financial stability in the OIC countries and facilitating economic growth.
Appendix A: Recommendation of the expert meeting on enhancing the capacity of financial markets to promote intra-investment among IDB member countries
Experts from twelve institutions (securities commission, stock exchanges and international Islamic financial institutions) from member countries of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), met at the IDB headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 26-27 June 2004 and made the following recommendations.
CAPACITY BUILDING AND INVESTMENT PROMOTION
• In order to attract capital flows into member countries, the primary focus should be on developing and strengthening investment fundamentals, which remain vital criteria for investors.
• Priority should be given to actions aimed at strengthening relatively under-developed stock markets.
• Better infrastructure to enhance the capacity of secondary markets should be developed.
• Ways and means should be found to keep transaction costs as low as possible.
• Conditions for promotion of cross-listings should be created.
• Acceptable levels of transparency and disclosure standards should be ensured.
• Markets should be opened to foreign investors.
• Free flow of funds to and from member countries should be encouraged and facilitated.
• Commitment for effective regulatory and supervisory frameworks should be ensured.
• Quality listings should be secured.
• The role of saving institutions and institutional investors as a way of strengthening the capacity of member countries' stock markets should be ensured.
INTEGRATION OF STOCK MARKETS
• There should be a focus on enhancing linkages between relatively well-developed markets.
• Cross-border listing should be encouraged.
• MOUs between IDB member countries should be facilitated with a view to enhancing inter markets linkages and boosting intra-investment flows.
• Alliances/mergers between stock markets should be encouraged to harmonize their institutional frameworks and to stimulate stock markets' activities.
• Alliances between market intermediaries should be encouraged to tap the liquidity pools, rather than having the individual investors do the cross-border trading.
• Sound policies (monetary/fiscal/exchange rate policies) should be developed to ensure currency stability.
• Central banks should be engaged in the implications of monetary policies on the domestic capital markets.
• The IDB could play a facilitating role in the networking of stock exchange managers, regulators, and the Islamic finance infrastructure institutions. 
